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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












ASSOCIATED WHOLESALERS, INC. 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 12-cv-02540) 
District Judge:  Hon. James Knoll Gardner 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2014 
 
Before:   AMBRO, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 10, 2014) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Edward O’Connell appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of his former 
employer, Associated Wholesalers, Inc. (“AWI”), for age discrimination claims he 




“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 630, et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the 
“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I.   Background
1
 
O’Connell was hired in January 1996 by AWI, a wholesale distributor of food and 
grocery-related products, and worked for the company until his termination in 2010.  He 
was 44 years old when he was hired and began to work as a Category Management 
Director for AWI’s “Center Store,” a job he held until early 2008.
2
  In April 2008, Bernie 
Ellis, the President of AWI, implemented a reorganization which included making 
O’Connell the Director of Procurement and Private Brands.  This was not a promotion 
and did not change his salary.  Around the same time his job changed, O’Connell began 
reporting to Wilford B. Donovan III, the Vice President of Center Store.  In his new 
position, O’Connell oversaw the Center Store inventory, which included responsibilities 
to supervise the procurement of products, eliminate overstock products, and develop 
marketing strategies.   
O’Connell felt that Donovan became “increasingly critical” of his job performance 
soon after the reorganization.  (App. at 122.)  According to O’Connell, he received 
criticism for incidents that were blown out of proportion or were unfairly recorded, which 
led him to think that he was being targeted for termination based on his age.     
                                              
1
 Consistent with our standard of review, see infra note 8, we view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-movant, O’Connell. 
2
 “Center Store” refers to AWI’s dairy, frozen, grocery, health, and beauty 




In January 2010, Donovan asked O’Connell “out of the blue” when he was going 
to retire.  (App. at 124.)  That was the only instance in which Donovan asked O’Connell 
about retirement.
3
  Around the same time, AWI hired Dennis Kreitz, who was in his 30s, 
as a Category Manager of the Center Store.  Donovan asked O’Connell to train Kreitz on 
duties that O’Connell had taken over from a recently resigned Category Manager and for 
which O’Connell did not receive any increase in salary.  O’Connell trained Kreitz for 
approximately the next six months until O’Connell was terminated.  As a consequence, 
“[e]verything … Kreitz was responsible for at the time of [O’Connell’s] termination 
came off [O’Connell’s] desk.”
4
  (App. at 128.) 
O’Connell was terminated on July 19, 2010, at the age of 58.  A written notice 
addressed to O’Connell on that date stated that his “position as Director, Procurement and 
Private Brands [wa]s being eliminated.”  (App. at 165.)  O’Connell testified at his 
deposition that he had “no idea what Kreitz did after [his] termination” and that he did 
not know who took over his responsibilities.  (App. at 129.) 
Between July 2009 and December 2010, Donovan terminated two additional 
employees who were 40 years old or older and hired at least three manager- or director-
                                              
3
 When asked at his deposition whether there were “[a]ny other comments or 
conversation[s] that would lead [him] to believe age was a factor” in his termination, 
O’Connell testified that Donovan made two hostile comments in April 2009 and April 
2010 about a business-related dispute and a special project, respectively.  On their face, 
these comments were unrelated to age. 
4




level employees who were younger than O’Connell.
5
  In addition, AWI hired a 60-year-
old individual for a new director-level position nine months after O’Connell left.  
Overall, between July 2009 and December 2010, AWI hired 43 new employees and 
terminated 75 employees at the AWI facility where O’Connell worked.
6
   
O’Connell testified that, even before being terminated, he believed that he was 
being targeted based on his age but did not raise any complaints or concerns at the time 
because he “felt intimidated to do so.”  (App. at 118.)  On December 5, 2010, several 
months after his termination, O’Connell sent Audrey Schein, AWI’s Vice President of 
Human Resources, a letter stating that, “upon reflection, I feel that my age was the 
primary reason for termination of my employment.”  (App. at 206.)  In response, Schein 
wrote that “age was not a factor” in AWI’s decision to terminate O’Connell but that 
[d]eclining sales required a close examination of the allocation of resources 
necessary to accomplish the goals and objectives of [AWI].  As a result, 
functional areas and departments were restructured to achieve greater 
efficiency, reduce expenses and increase customer focus and service levels.  
Some positions throughout [AWI] were eliminated and, unfortunately, your 
position was one of them. 
 
The decision to eliminate a position was based on the position itself not on 
who held the position. 
 
(App. at 207.) 
 
 O’Connell subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the United States 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that AWI terminated 
                                              
5
 There is no indication that any of these employees took over any of O’Connell’s 
responsibilities.   
6
 O’Connell does not dispute that the relevant time frame for this case includes 




his employment in violation of the ADEA.  He also filed a charge with the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission, alleging a violation of the PHRA.  O’Connell brought this 
discrimination suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania after the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter.
7
  Following the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of AWI, O’Connell timely filed this appeal. 
II.   Discussion
8
 
Under the ADEA and PHRA, an employer is prohibited from discharging an 
individual because of the individual’s age.
9
  When claims under the ADEA and PHRA 
                                              
7
 AWI does not dispute that O’Connell met the procedural prerequisites to file the 
instant action. 
8
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same standard as the district court.  Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. 
Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012).  “Summary judgment should only be granted if 
‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.’”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  
“In considering the record, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party … .”  Id.   
We exercise plenary review of a district court’s authority under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and its interpretation of those rules.  Lassiter v. City of Phila., 716 
F.3d 53, 54 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013); EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 264 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
9
 The ADEA provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer 
… to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  The PHRA provides, in relevant part: 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice … [f]or any employer 
because of the … age … of any individual … to discharge from 
employment such individual … or to otherwise discriminate against such 
individual … with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions 
or privileges of employment … if the individual … is the best able and 
most competent to perform the services required. 




are based on indirect and circumstantial evidence, as they are here, the burden-shifting 
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 
applies.  Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 704-05 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997).  
If the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment action.  Id.  The burden of going forward with the 
evidence then shifts back to plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the articulated reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.  Id. 
AWI primarily asserts that O’Connell was terminated because his position was 
eliminated during budget cuts and restructuring.  O’Connell does not dispute that AWI 
articulated a non-discriminatory reason to terminate his employment.
10
  He does, 
however, contend that the proffered reason was a mere pretext. 
The District Court granted summary judgment to AWI on the grounds that 
O’Connell had not established a prima facie case of age discrimination or, alternatively, 
that O’Connell had not shown that AWI’s rationale for terminating his employment was 
                                              
10
 The District Court treated this case as a reduction-in-force (“RIF”) case, which 
O’Connell argues was erroneous.  A RIF case is one in which the employer’s decision is 
“motivated on a programmatic level by economic concerns.”  Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 
445 F.3d 702, 707 (3d Cir. 2006).  We apply the McDonnell Douglas framework 
regardless.  Id.  However, in a RIF case, one of the elements of the prima facie case – 
whether the employee was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to create an 
inference of age discrimination – “becomes whether the employer retained employees 
who do not belong to the protected class.”  Id. at 706 n.4.  We assume that O’Connell has 





pretextual.  We agree that, even assuming arguendo that O’Connell had carried his 
burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of age discrimination, no reasonable 
factfinder could find pretext.  Therefore, we will not address the prima facie case and will 
affirm on the basis that O’Connell has not met his burden of showing pretext under the 
McDonnell Douglas framework. 
The District Court relied on O’Connell’s failure to file a statement in opposition to 
AWI’s statement of undisputed facts to find that AWI’s proffered rationale for 
terminating O’Connell was not in dispute.  Specifically, the Court adopted, as matters of 
undisputed fact, that AWI had to restructure its business in order to weather an ongoing 
recession; that personnel duties were realigned to increase efficiency and decrease 
redundancy; and that elimination of O’Connell’s position was a part of those goals.  
Under those facts, the Court held that “no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason provided by [AWI] for laying off [O’Connell] was 
mere pretext.”  (App. at 53.) 
O’Connell acknowledges that he failed to file a separate statement of undisputed 
facts in the manner required by the Court’s Rule 16 status conference order.  He argues, 
however, that the District Court improperly adopted AWI’s statement of undisputed facts 
because nothing “in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, the Local Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or even [the District Judge’s] own procedures found on the Court website” 
alludes to any requirement of a separate statement of undisputed facts.  (Appellant’s 




While O’Connell is correct that no rules or procedures mandated the filing of a 
responsive statement of undisputed facts, the “contention that the District Court could not 
act in the conceded absence of any local rule … is obviously unsound.”  Eash v. Riggins 
Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 569 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. 
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 n.8 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 83(b) expressly provides: 
A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, 
rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district’s local 
rules.  No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for 
noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the 
local rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular 
case with actual notice of the requirement. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b). 
Here, the requirement to file a separate statement responsive to AWI’s statement 
of undisputed facts was consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which 
provides, in relevant part: “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed 
must support the assertion by … citing to particular parts of materials in the record … or 
… showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 
dispute … .”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).  Moreover, the requirement for O’Connell to file a 
separate statement of undisputed facts – and the consequences for not doing so – were 
explicitly set forth in the Court’s Rule 16 status conference order dated October 26, 2012: 
[A]ny party opposing a motion for summary judgment or partial summary 
judgment shall file and serve, in addition to a brief, a separate short concise 
statement, responding in numbered paragraphs to the moving party’s 
statement of the material facts about which the opposing party contends 
there is a genuine dispute, with specific citations to the record, and, where 




assertions set forth in the moving party’s statement shall be deemed 
admitted unless specifically denied by the opposing party in the manner set 
forth in this paragraph. 
 
(Dkt. 15 at 3 (emphasis added).)  As this constituted actual notice, the District Court 




Even if the Court had improperly adopted AWI’s statement of undisputed facts, 
we would still affirm the summary judgment order because, based on the evidence of 
record, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that AWI’s rationale was pretextual.  To 
survive summary judgment in a discrimination case when the defendant has answered the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its action, “the 
plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder 
could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or 
(2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating 
or determinative cause of the employer’s action.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 
(3d Cir. 1994).  To do so, the plaintiff must show “such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate 
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of 
credence.”  Id. at 765 (internal quotation marks omitted).  O’Connell has not carried his 
burden in that regard.  
                                              
11
 We also note that O’Connell does not offer any justification for his failure to 
comply with the Court’s order.  Nor did he attempt to remedy it, even after AWI raised 




He takes the position that AWI’s non-discriminatory rationale for terminating him 
is “highly doubtful”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 31) and, “at best, a disputed issue” 
(Appellant’s Reply Br. at 10) because the evidence demonstrates AWI’s age-based 
animus towards him.  He posits several reasons a factfinder might disbelieve AWI or 
believe that AWI was motivated by an invidious discriminatory reason:  Donovan’s 
alleged age-based animus against him, the circumstances of Kreitz’s hiring and training, 
and the hiring patterns of Donovan and AWI in the relevant time period.   
O’Connell argues that Donovan made several comments evidencing age-based 
animus toward him, but the only age-related remark Donovan allegedly made was “when 
are you going to retire.”  (App. at 124.)  We have held that “[s]tray remarks by non-
decisionmakers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given 
great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote from the date of 
decision.”  Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 
1992).  While it is unclear to what extent Donovan took part in the decision to terminate 
O’Connell, there is no evidence that his question about retirement was related to 
O’Connell’s termination.  Combined with the temporal distance from O’Connell’s 
termination – approximately seven months – it deserves no significant weight.
12
  
O’Connell spends significant effort painting a picture of his “unblemished career in 
grocery marketing” before he started reporting to Donovan (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 
                                              
12
 O’Connell’s assertion that Donovan made two other work-related comments 
that led him to believe that he was being targeted because of his age reflects nothing more 




18), and asserting that Donovan “subjected [him] to unwarranted and unprecedented 
criticism of his job performance” (id. at 7-8).  That, however, is an assertion unsupported 
by the record.  O’Connell testified at deposition regarding prior criticism that he had 
received, such as a 2007 performance review, and does not dispute that he received 
subsequent criticism for incidents in which he raised his voice or pointed his finger in the 
face of another employee.  O’Connell provides no meaningful connection between 
Donovan’s criticism and age-based animus beyond mere speculation or conclusive 
assertions that he was being targeted for his age. 
Meanwhile, O’Connell’s argument that he was at least partially replaced by a 
younger employee – Kreitz – ignores a key fact.  There is no dispute that the 
responsibilities that Kreitz assumed were previously the responsibilities of a Category 
Manager who had resigned.  The duties were assigned to O’Connell, without extra 
compensation, before Kreitz was hired to take over those responsibilities.  At most, 
Kreitz inherited responsibilities that were temporarily assigned to O’Connell and that 
were not part of O’Connell’s core duties.  O’Connell admitted at his deposition that he 
did not know how his duties were assigned after his termination to Kreitz or otherwise.  
Furthermore, his argument that other, younger managers or directors besides Kreitz might 
have taken over his responsibilities also amounts to mere speculation and is contradicted 
by Schein’s testimony that an Account Manager for AWI’s broker – not any AWI 
employee – is performing O’Connell’s old job responsibilities.   
 O’Connell draws attention to evidence that three other managers or directors who 




than himself and that AWI hired 43 new employees “in a time of supposed austerity and 
cost-cutting.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 27.)  However, O’Connell overlooks the 
undisputed evidence in the record that, in the same time period, AWI also terminated 75 
employees at the plant where O’Connell worked, resulting in a net decrease in its work 
force.  AWI asserts that, of the 43 new employees hired, 17 were 40 years old or older, 
and of the 75 employees terminated, 30 were under the age of 40.
13
  O’Connell does not 
dispute those numbers.  The undisputed evidence does not demonstrate the age-based 
animus that O’Connell tries to distill from it.
14
 
Therefore, even if one were to ignore the failure of O’Connell’s to file a response 
to AWI’s statement of undisputed facts, he has not pointed to sufficient evidence in the 
record to allow a reasonable factfinder either to disbelieve AWI’s articulated reasons for 
terminating him or to believe that an age-based animus was more likely than not a 
                                              
13
  Insofar as O’Connell focuses specifically on individuals hired and terminated 
within Donovan’s division, he glosses over the fact that AWI also hired a 45-year-old 
individual in August 2010 and a 60-year-old individual in spring of 2011 to work under 
Donovan’s supervision.  Even if the hiring of some under-40 individuals created a net 
influx of younger employees working for Donovan, that fact, considered with the rest of 
the evidence, does not cast sufficient doubt on AWI’s non-discriminatory reasons for 
terminating O’Connell to overcome summary judgment. 
14
 O’Connell points out that AWI did not consider “offering [him] continued 
employment or a position at a reduced salary.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 26.)  He 
argues that this undermines AWI’s purported “cost-cutting regimen.”  (Id.)  However, 
AWI explained that its elimination of O’Connell’s position was the result of not only 
cost-cutting, but also efforts to restructure the company in order to eliminate 
redundancies and increase efficiency – reasons consistent with a decision not to consider 
retaining O’Connell at a lower salary.  And to the extent O’Connell is arguing that he 
should have been retained over younger or less experienced employees, we have rejected 
the argument that the law requires “the ‘bumping’ of lower-level sufficiently younger 
employees in order to retain protected workers.”  Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assurance Co., 




motivating or determinative cause of AWI’s action.  Accordingly, he has not 
demonstrated that AWI’s non-discriminatory reasons for terminating him were mere 
pretext. 
III.   Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of AWI and against O’Connell. 
